S.L.A Marshall’s book ‘Men Against Fire” published the controversial estimate that only about 17% of the men in a typical US Army unit fired at the enemy. In “elite” units manned by more highly trained and aggressive soldiers (Marshal cites the Airborne units), the claim was only 25% of the men fired their weapons.
Marshall arrived at this conclusion due to his method of battlefield research - as soon as possible after an action, he would gather the surviving soldiers in a group and have them narrate the battle, guided by his questions. For example, if someone were to say “then I saw Bill throw a grenade”, Marshall would turn to Bill and ask “then what happened”? In this way the action could be reconstructed right down to individual actions. Several things became apparent as these interviews progressed:
- Once soldiers went to ground under fire, their momentum ended. Most soldiers were reluctant to break cover once they felt safe
- Soldiers often had little idea where the enemy actually was, so felt they had nothing to fire at. Marshall apparently coined the term “the empty battlefield” based on this. A soldier under cover not only had no targets to engage, but also could no longer see his comrades either.
- The soldiers who did fire their weapons tended to be those who had more powerful weapons and felt they did have the ability to influence the battle. This would include BAR gunners and crew served weapons. In the case of a crew served weapon, the presence of a “battle buddy” right beside you helped overcome fear, or at least provided a sense of shame for letting your comrade down if you didn’t do your part.
Obviously, in a fluid situation, not all these factors might play out, or not all at the same time. It also seems others arrived at similar conclusions during the war as well. General Patton, for example, ordered that his infantry in the 3rd Army use “marching fire”. By not going to ground, momentum could be maintained and everyone would be in sight of their comrades.
Australian soldiers practice the use of a Bren gun while advancing. This is what an advance using marching fire would resemble
The Red Army used “Tank Riders” (tankodesantniki) for close protection of tanks and during assaults, and often armed them with PPSH-41 submachineguns in order to have massive amounts of firepower. Operating in large numbers and closely supported by their tanks, this also represented a formidable amount of fighting power, which would have boosted morale and the will to fight.
Tankodesantniki dismount
However these expedient methods were not arrived at by any rigorous study or testing, and had serious issues of their own, especially in terms of being highly vulnerable to enemy fire during contact. However, changes in training and equipment in the post war era did bring the numbers of soldiers willing to engage higher. Innovations included more advanced marksmanship training using variable ranges and man shaped targets rather than known distance ranges using silhouette targets, instruction on how to use searching fire against suspected enemy positions, the introduction of effective personal body armour and the pushing of more powerful weapons down to the platoon and squad levels, such as fully automatic battle and then assault rifles, man portable grenade launchers, lightweight anti tank rockets and ATGM’s and light machine guns, as well as changes in tactical doctrine, the use of continuing voice commands and even personal radios to allow soldiers to feel they are in touch with their comrades and leaders.
British army today
So while there might always be human soldiers who are going to be reluctant, unable or unwilling to fire at the enemy, the percentage of those who have engaged enemy troops has climbed considerably since WWII. I believe the number had risen to 75% during the Viet Nam war, and may be as high as 90% today. With such a high number of soldiers firing, the enemy is more likely to be suppressed, providing a much better chance for your side to advance and achieve victory.
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