Why was Brussels chosen as the capital of EU?

Barnaby Lane

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Why was Brussels chosen as the capital of EU and not a more central location or more populous nation like Berlin in Germany or Paris?

It had to be in one of the founder members of the ECSC, which means Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands or West Germany.

But it could not be in one of the large countries (Italy, West Germany or France) because that would be taken as an affront to the two others. Belgium has the advantage that it has language and cultural backgrounds from France (which is associated with the south) and The Netherlands (which is associated with the north).

The need to avoid upsetting one of the large members has always been the key to understanding how the EU works. Every subsidy, every regulation, every protectionist measure,… it is and always has been, designed for the implicit purpose of feathering the nest of one of the large members.

Incidentally, it’s interesting to observe how the members of this ‘club’ of large players who have an outsized influence on EU policy, has evolved over time. At the EU’s foundation in the 1990s, it was common among EU policy circles to talk of “the big four” (Germany, France, Italy and the UK). This somewhat changed in the 2000s because the EU started to feel the need to keep Berlusconi at arm’s length. “The big four” thus became “the big three”.

What advantages were there in belonging to this implicit ‘club’? Well, there was an implicit understanding that the EU would:

1. never override the explicit view of any of ‘the club’ in respect of any regulatory measure that affected its key industry. This meant the EU would never ignore the view of the German government on measures affecting manufacturing, or the French government relating to agriculture, or the UK government relating to financial services
2. never override the explicit view of any of ‘the club’ in respect to the appointment of the President of the European Commission

So in respect of both of the above, each member of ‘the club’ had a de facto (though not de jure) veto.

Then, after the Global Financial Crisis, the EU did explicitly ignore the UK’s input in the development of new financial services regulation. It bought into the view that (for self-interested reasons) was being promoted by the French government, that the Global Financial Crisis was somehow the UK’s fault.

And in 2014, the EU explicitly overrode the UK’s strong opposition to appointing the arch-federalist and EU fundamentalist Jean-Claude Juncker, to the position of President of the European Commission.

It was at this point that many began to realise that “the big three” had now become “the big two” and that was one of the factors leading to Brexit. During the Brexit negotiations, “the big two” became “the big three” again, as the EU temporarily admitted Ireland. However, in taking steps to close down Ireland’s economic model (tax haven), thereby violating principle 1 above, the EU has now discarded Ireland and we’re once again back to “the big two”.

It will be interesting to see how the the centre of gravity of EU power evolves from here. With Thierry Breton effectively running the Commission’s legislative agenda at present, I suspect people will soon start to talk about “the big one”. After that, it will be entirely safe to move the European Commission to Berlin.